



USS HADDO NEWSLETTER



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From the Editor:

Still need more input from the Haddo community.

From Ralph Stroede

I had hoped to have some reunion info ready but am having a hard time. I should have something for April's Newsletter. If I solidify something before then I will send it out to the whole mailing list. You could say that it is going to be in Sept. of 2018 but haven't determined where yet.

My thoughts on the following are to stop whining and get used to it. Male sailors who cannot adapt and be mature about it are the problem.

WOMEN IN SUBMARINES

In 2011 COMSUBLANT/COMSUBPAC started integrating Female Officers on Submarines. The goal was to place three Female Officers on selected SSGN/SSBN Submarines. Most of the ships get one female Supply Officer and two nuclear trained female Officers. On SSGN/SSBN Submarines there are five, three 'man' staterooms for officers. Each stateroom has a door. There is one Officer head. The head has two toilets, two showers, and one sink. When occupied a sign is hung on the door (male/female) to show who is occupying it.

Sailors that I have talked to find women on submarines to be an inconvenience:

- Guys can no-longer jump out of their bunk and walk to a head. As a minimum they have to put on a pair of pants. On the USS Georgia they also have to put on at least a tee shirt with sleeves. (Wife beater tee shirts are considered inappropriate.)
- If there are less Female Officers than a number divisible by three, the ship goes to sea with empty Officer bunks.

c) On USS Wyoming the Female Supply Officer became pregnant and had to be transferred, causing an inconvenience in getting a last minute replacement.

After the Female Officer 'test' period, the Navy decided to move forward and start integrating enlisted females on submarines. In 2016 USS Michigan, SSGN727 was the first submarine to be modified to carry enlisted females. USS Florida, SSGN728 had the modifications completed in April 2017. The goal is to place 30 females, 3 Chiefs and 27 Enlisted on each modified submarine. That is in addition to the 3 female Officers. Normal crew size (Officers & Enlisted) is approximately 155.

On SSGN & SSBN the enlisted berthing is in the Missile Compartment. There are 9-man bunkrooms outboard the missile tubes. The bunks are stacked three high, in a 'U' shape. Each bunkroom has a privacy curtain blocking viewing from the passageway.

The 9-Man bunk room outboard tubes 3 & 5 was removed and expanded into a larger head. A crews' activity space was ripped out and a 9-man bunkroom installed in its place. The activity space had 11 small cubical desks where sailors could read/study/etc. The crew lost their activity space. The Missile Compartment aft head was modified into two heads, one for females.

The Chiefs Quarters has a lounge area and 15 bunks total. The berthing is outboard of the lounge area on the Port and Starboard sides. The bunks are in different size cubes (2 man, 3 man, etc). Each cube area has a privacy curtain. The head was modified into two heads. A three man cube has direct access to one head and will serve as the female berthing/ female head.

As I previously stated, the initial goal was three female Officers, 3 female Chiefs, and 27 enlisted. But with the way the berthing areas and heads are setup, the number of women can be increase. (Urinals are no

longer being installed on ANY Navy ships.) Electric Boat Corporation is in the process of modifying the Virginia Class Submarine design so that they can carry females. Because woman tend to be shorter, part of that design includes adding mechanical reach rods onto valves and lowering Emergency Air Breathing manifolds. Mechanical gearing is also being added to large valves so they are easier to turn.

I know of three incidents on SSBN submarines involving Female Officers.

1) Most people probably heard about the incident on the USS Wyoming, SSBN742. It made National News. A young Enlisted Sailor, using great ingenuity and resourcefulness, hid a video camera in the Officer Head. He was able to capture footage of two Female Officers. Needless to say, because he shared the videos with some of his shipmates, he was eventually caught. Not only was he punished, but anyone that saw or knew of the videos was also punished. To prevent further embarrassment to the Female Officers, they were transferred not only off the ship, but out of the local area.

2) The USS Nebraska, SSBN739 was conducting Midshipman Operations. A group of Midshipman would come onboard. The ship would then take them to sea for a few days and return. Some of the Midshipman were females. After the Midshipman Ops were completed, the ship deployed. Shortly after deployment (because there are no secrets in the submarine community) word leaked out and got back to the Chief of the Boat's wife, that the COB was having an affair with a Female Midshipman. On SSBN/SSGN's the COB has his own 'Private' Office. (Apparently, it was not private enough.)

3) A year or two before the item 1), incident on USS Wyoming, the same ship had a Change of Command. The relieved CO had a very rewarding tour while on the ship, made full Captain and was being transferred to a more prestigious position. The morning after the Change of Command he took his own life. The investigation into his death revealed he was having an affair with his Supply Officer. (The pregnant Officer item c) above.)

I am sure there are more incidents out there and now that two SSGN ships are carrying female enlisted, the incidents will probably increase. From my perspective, the good news is, at least they're having sex with the opposite sex.

Haddo 604 Memories

Haddo Chronology and narrative history

Provided by Tim France

9 Sept. 1960	Keel laid at New York Shipbuilding Corp. Camden, NJ.
18. Aug. 1962	Launched
16. Dec. 1964	Commissioned, CO, CDR John G. Williams, Jr., USN.
8. Feb. 1965	Haddo arrives at her home port, Charleston, South Carolina, and reports to Commander Submarine squadron FOUR.
7. Jun. 1965	Haddo deploys to the Mediterranean; First ship of the class to serve with the Sixth Fleet.
11. Dec. 1965	LCDR Robert W. Chewning, USN relieved CDR John G. Williams, Jr. USN as Commanding Officer
5. Jan. 1967	CO, USS HADDO letters serials 0001 thru 0005 of 3 January and 0006 of 4 January 67 refer to sensitive operations of higher classification
27. Aug. 1967	CO, USS Haddo letters serials 0007 thru 00015 of 26 Aug 67 refer to sensitive operations of higher classification.
8 Sept. 1967	CDR Gerald W. Muench, USN, relieved CDR Robert W. Chewning as CO. Chewning awarded Legion of Merit for operations in 1966, LCDR Harry L. Mathis, USN, Executive Officer awarded Navy Commendation Metal
27 Oct. 1967	Haddo received Navy Unit Commendation for operations in 1966
31 May. 1968	CO, USS Haddo letters serials 0001 thru 0007 of 29 May 1968 and 0008 thru 00011 of 30 May

	1968, refer to sensitive operations of higher classification.
17 Oct. 1968	Haddo received Meritorious Unit Commendation for operations in 1967. Haddo also received Battle Efficiency "E" for SUBDIV Forty-Two, FY 1968
6 March 1969	CO, USS Haddo letters serials 0001 thru 00010 of 7 March refer to sensitive operations of higher classification
4 Aug. 1969	Haddo Commenced a scheduled eighteen month overhaul at Charleston Naval Shipyard
13 Sept. 1969	Haddo received the Battle "E" for SUBDIV Forty-Two, FY 1969. The second consecutive award. The Commanding Officer, CDR Gerald W. Muench, USN, received the Navy Commendation Medal for operations in 1969

Narrative History of USS Haddo (SSN 604)

The keel of USS Haddo (SSN 604) was laid at New York Shipbuilding Corporation, Camden New Jersey on 9 September 1960. Launching took place on 18 August 1962 with Mrs. Henry M. Jackson, wife of the United States Senator from the state of Washington, acting as ships sponsor at the christening and launching ceremony. First builders trials were conducted on 27 September 1964. Sonar and acceptance trials followed on 16 November and 1 December 1964 by Rear Admiral Robert W. Cavenagh, USN. Commandant Fourth Naval District. Haddo's first Commanding Officer was Commander John G. Williams, Jr., USN of Ilwaco, Washington. After commissioning, the remainder of 1964 was spent at New York Shipbuilding Corporation undergoing a restricted availability and the ship departed Camden on 17 January 1965.

On 22 January 1965, Haddo arrived in New London for two weeks refresher training. After refresher training she reported to her home port of Charleston, S. C. for the first time on 8 February 1965, and joined the ships of Submarine Squadron Four. On 23 February she

departed Charleston for fleet exercises in the Caribbean and visits to Saint Thomas, San Juan and Roosevelt Roads. During the month of April, sound trials were conducted in Euma Sound and torpedo acceptance trials were conducted at Fort Lauderdale, Florida. She returned to Charleston on 15 April and participated in fleet exercises and local operations until 4 June when she commenced preparations for overseas movement. On 7 July Haddo deployed with the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

While in the Mediterranean, she participated in numerous exercises with ship of the Sixth Fleet and NATO Countries and visited the ports of: Italy; Toulon, France; Golfe-Juan, France; Taranto, Italy; and Rota, Spain. Haddo returned to Charleston on 7 November. The remainder of 1965 was spent in upkeep at Charleston. On 11 December 1965, LCDR Robert Chewing, USN relieved CDR John G. Williams, Jr., USN as Commanding Officer.

On February 11 1966, Haddo departed Charleston for St. Croix, Virgin Islands for torpedo trials. She then returned to Charleston on 4 March and remained in port until 21 March when she departed for fleet exercises in the Atlantic including a 3 day stop in Bermuda., B.W.I. From 28-30 March. The 19th to 26th of April was spent in Norfolk, Virginia, where the ship was depermed. On 28 April, Haddo entered the Charleston Naval Ship Yard for her post Shakedown Availability until 19 August. Submarine exercises were then conducted from 25 August to 15 September. On 17 October 1966, Haddo departed for an Atlantic submarine exercise for the remainder of the year, returning to Charleston on 5 January 1967.

After a month of leave and upkeep, Haddo resumed operations by participating in ASWEX VI in mid-February 1967. In March, Haddo successfully completed a Weapons Acceptance Inspection (NWI) for SUBROC and departed for Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico and St. Croix, Virgin Islands for weapons system accuracy trials. Upon completion of WSAT and SUBROC certification, Haddo stopped briefly in Charleston on the way to participation in ASWEX VII in late April and early May 1967.

Returning from ASWEX on 5 May 1967, Haddo underwent an extended upkeep period in Charleston before leaving 9 June for a second Atlantic Submarine Exercise. Following Haddo's return to Charleston 27 August, the ship underwent a three week upkeep period highlighted by a change of command ceremony on 8 September when Commander Robert W. Chewing was relieved by Commander Gerald W. Muench. The ceremony included the presentation of

the Legion of Merit to Commander Chewning and the Navy Commendation Medal to Lieutenant Commander Harry L. Mathis, ship's Executive Officer, by Rear Admiral J. S. Dorsey, USN, Commandant SIXTH Naval District, for their performance on Haddo during operations in 1966.

Upon completion of the upkeep period, Haddo underwent two weeks of type training from 18 to 29 September. On 5 October 1967 the ship was again underway, this time to participate in project operations in the vicinity of Bermuda. On 27 October 1967, Haddo was back in Charleston where Rear Admiral D. G. Baer, Commander Submarine Flotilla Six, presented the ship with the Navy Unit Commendation. The citation, signed by the Secretary of the Navy, read in part "For exceptionally meritorious service during a period in 1966 in the completion of an extremely important and arduous independent submarine operation (which) made contributions of significant value to the defense of the United States." The Officers and men of Haddo were commended for "marked resourcefulness, persistence and professional skill in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Haddo then conducted two weeks of type training which included and Operational Readiness Inspection following which, from 17 to 17 November, Haddo participated in more project operations; this time out of Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Having operated 18 out of the previous 21 weeks, Haddo returned to Charleston on 18 November 1967 for a well earned rest and a restricted availability/interim dry-docking in Charleston Naval Shipyard over the Christmas holidays.

On 8 February 1968, Haddo was again ready for sea and returned to Fort Lauderdale, Florida for another week of project operations followed by a week of equipment checkout and calibration.

On 22 February 1968 Haddo returned to Charleston for an extended upkeep period in preparation for another deployment, her fourth since commissioning.

Haddo was underway from 18-22 March 1968 for training and final equipment checkout prior to deployment.

On 31 May Haddo returned to Charleston from deployment. She underwent an upkeep which included extensive modification and modernization of the sonar set.

On 1 July 1968, Haddo was again underway. Operating out of Fort Lauderdale, Florida Haddo was

involved in testing and experimental periscopes. These operations included a Fourth of July visit to Fort Lauderdale.

Haddo returned to Charleston on 11 July and on 15 July entered Charleston Naval Shipyard for removal of the test periscopes and replacement of the storage battery. This work was quickly completed and on 24 July Haddo moved to Pier November for upkeep and completion of sonar modifications.

Haddo was again underway on 26 August 1968. She participated in a torpedo firing exercise and a submarine versus submarine ASW exercise, also during this period, services were provided to patrol aircraft of Commander, Antisubmarine Warfare Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

Haddo returned to Charleston on 3 October, for a short upkeep. On 17 October 68, Haddo was presented the Meritorious Unit Commendation by RADM L. G. Bernard, USN, Commander Submarine Flotilla SIX, for operations during a period in 1967. The citation, presented at Pier November, U.S. Naval Base, Charleston, read, in part "The outstanding results achieved during this operation testify to the exceptional professional skill, resourcefulness, and ingenuity of her dedicated officers and men, Their technical knowledge, loyal devotion to duty, and coordinated team spirit were responsible for the exceptional degree of success attained." During the ceremony, Captain H. G. Hanssen, USN, Commander Submarine Squadron Four, presented Haddo the battle efficiency "E" for fiscal year 1968.

Haddo was underway on 18 October, for New London, Connecticut. Arriving in New London on 20 October, She entered floating dry dock (ARD-7) on 21 October, to correct torpedo tube problems and to perform some much needed hull preservation. This work was completed on 28 October, and Haddo departed New London the following day. After conducting sonar exercises enroute, Haddo arrived at Charleston on 3 November.

After a week in port, Haddo departed Charleston on 10 November to provide services to Commander, Submarine Development TWO, in an exercise to develop submarine tactics. Upon completion of this exercise, Haddo participated in an ASW Fixed Wing Evaluation Exercise, operating against aircraft of the USS Essex (CVS 9).

Haddo returned to Charleston on 26 November 1968 and began preparations for her fifth deployment. She conducted local operations from 16-19 December and on

6 January 1969, Haddo departed for an extended at-sea period.

Haddo returned to Charleston from Deployment on 6 March 1969 for an upkeep period. Sea trials were conducted from 15-18 April. Haddo was underway on 21 April to provide services to Aircraft.

Haddo returned to Charleston on 26 April, to pick up the CINCLANTFLT Nuclear Power Examining Board. Haddo returned to Charleston on 30 April, after a successful Operational Reactor Safeguard Examination.

After a short time in port, Haddo was underway on 6 May, for exercises with an FBM submarine returning from patrol. Haddo returned to Charleston on 15 May. After approximately three hours in port, she was underway by order of COMSUBLANT to fire a SUBROC as part of a presidential fleet presentation. The weapon performed successfully and on 17 April, Haddo proceeded to Grand Turk to conduct and Operational Suitability Test of the same weapons system.

Haddo returned to Charleston on 26 May, for an upkeep period. She was underway on 23 June to participate in communications drills and to provide services to aircraft. She returned to Charleston on 28 June for a refit period along side submarine tender Hunley.

Haddo was underway on 20 July, enroute to the U.S. Naval Academy on a goodwill tour. At Annapolis, midshipmen boarded Haddo, were briefed on her capabilities, and given tours. Haddo left the Naval Academy on 25 July, and arrived the same day in Norfolk to off-load weapons preparatory to undergoing overhaul.

Haddo was underway on 26 July for Charleston. After arriving in Charleston, a dependents' cruise was conducted on 2 August 1969.

On 4 August 1969, Haddo entered Charleston Naval Shipyard for an 18 month "Sub-safe" overhaul.

On 13 September 1969, an awards ceremony was held and Captain W. R. Banks, USN, Commander Submarine Squadron Four, presented Haddo the Battle Efficiency "E" for fiscal year 1969, her second in as many years. CDR Muench was presented the Naval Commendation Medal by RADM J. B. Osborn, USN, Commander Submarine Flotilla Six, for operations in Haddo during the spring of 1969.

The remainder of 1969 was spent in dry-dock undergoing the extensive repairs and modifications inherent in a "Sub-safe" overhaul, designed to improve submerged safety.

End of narrative.

Emails

From Dennis Searer

My first boat was the USS Corsair AGSS 435 a "school boat" out of New London of course. This is 1960 mates and there were four crew members aboard who wore the War Patrol pin on their dress blues. The one I remember was Rudolph W. Velle Motor Machinist Mate 1st class (SS). I didn't learn of his WW II experiences from MM 1 Velle but from other crew members. That just the way he was. I'll never forget him and his 'story'.

Dennis Searer STSCS (SS) USN Ret. USS Haddo SSN 604 1966 - 1968

<http://militaryhonors.sid-hill.us/history/velle.htm>

<http://www.jmlavelle.com/gunnel/patrol6.htm>

<http://www.thewesterlysun.com/home/8904610-154/steven-slosberg-quiet-man-of-mystic-hid-his-wartime-exploits.html>

A great story Ed. Hope I'm not too late for this edition.

Regards, Dennis

From Dan Brakke

Thanks so much for distributing the Haddo newsletter. My time on Haddo was short (March to November 1978) as it was my last duty station before separation.

Maybe some of your readers are already aware of it but, all of the WWII submarine war patrol logs are accessible on line at this site:

<https://maritime.org/doc/subreports.htm>

The logs for SS-255 Haddo can be found at this link:

<https://www.scribd.com/doc/175982336/SS-255-Haddo>

They are interesting reading, particularly when the boat engaged a contact and logged in their attack strategy details.

Dan Brakke

Many thanks for continuing the newsletter. Although I was only with HADDO during new construction, sea trials and shake-down, I remember with great fondness my shipmates during that period. I also enjoy reading the stories which you send of later deployments (and adventures) of SSN604.

Ray Sphar

CAPT MC USN (ret)

Plank Owner

From Ralph Stroede

Ed,
Admiral Carter was on Haddo Commissioning Crew who ended up as CinLantFleet...4 star! A true "Mustang"! Thought you could use it in the Newsletter.

Admiral Carter died in Harpers Ferry, WV on 28 June. Obituary is available in Naval Submarine League website. Recommend email to all Haddo sailors.

<http://usnhistory.navylive.dodlive.mil/2017/07/13/in-memoriam-admiral-powell-f-carter-jr/>

Ralph

From Robert Martin

A submarine skippers comments on surface ships.

Thoughts?

The recent collisions of two Navy Aegis guided-missile destroyers were not random, chance events. These were not torpedo attacks inflicted by an unseen enemy. The events were eminently avoidable, and thinking otherwise can kill a crew.

Almost all of my eight seagoing tours were conducted in the Seventh Fleet. I have transited in

and out of Tokyo Wan and Sagami Wan dozens of times, have passed through the Straits of Malacca, and have tied up in Hong Kong and Singapore. I've operated out of the very shallow moorages of Fiji and Saipan, as well as deep-water ports like Guam and Subic Bay, up north to Busan and down south to Perth. My crews and I have operated surfaced and submerged in very shallow and congested waters using little more than passive sonar, a periscope, some basic fire-control systems, maybe a speedboat-style consumer-market Furuno radar while on the surface, the Mark One Mod Zero eyeball, and most important, our brains.

During my final active-duty assignment prior to retirement, however, I spent more time on surface ships than on submarines. And I observed many cultural differences in the way the surface ships are operated. These differences may have some bearing on the conditions that contributed to the unfortunate outcomes.

This is not to suggest that submarines operate perfectly, which of course they do not. But there is a level of conservatism inherent in submarine operations that, as a general rule, I did not observe in the operation of surface combatants. That is the cultural underpinning of certain paradoxes I intend to demonstrate here.

The first paradox has to do with an ethos driven by the very nature of submarining. In a submarine, the presumption is that if a serious casualty occurs, the entire crew will be lost. Although there is no such thing as an acceptable number of deaths on any ship, in a submarine everyone knows that a serious mistake by anyone means the death of all. This induces a certain level of gravitas that I did not usually sense when embarked in surface combatants. The paradox, then, is that because surface crews may believe they are in less actual physical danger than do submarine crews, they may be more likely to act in ways that induce higher levels of risk than do their submarine counterparts, who operate with the knowledge that they are only one major casualty away from catastrophe.

On submarines every member of the crew, regardless of seniority level, is allowed to—is expected to—"call out" any other crewmember, up to and including the captain, any time he or she feels that something is wrong. Yes, a seaman apprentice is expected to correct the captain if he or she sees something wrong. If every crewmember is going to die in a serious casualty, then everyone is responsible for keeping it from happening.

The second and perhaps most profound paradox is that in matters that don't count, surface crews are far more "formal" than submarine crews. Then in matters that do count, they are far less so.

In their bearing and demeanor in the presence of the commanding officer (CO), surface crewmembers are very, for lack of a better expression, military in behavior. In contrast, submarine crewmembers tend to be substantially more informal—some might even say too informal, even within earshot of the CO. In matters of watchstanding and other areas where formality really does count, however, submarine crews are much more formal. This includes watch turnovers, watchstanding qualifications, readiness, discipline, and more.

The third paradox is that surface watchstanding qualifications do not appear to be as rigorous as submarine qualifications. Instead, they seem to be much more formulaic, “checklist-oriented,” and much less demanding and “learning-oriented,” than submarine qualifications. I found that the average submarine sonarman third class often knew more about the nature and propagation characteristics of sound than the average surface sonarman first class.

Paradox number four is that submarines are thought of as high tech (and they are), but surface crews seem to rely on the technology far more than submarine crews do. Even junior sonarman, fire-control technicians, and navigation technicians on submarines are taught to think through relative motion problems using mental methods, with the presumption that they always have to ask themselves if the situation presented by the machines actually makes sense. Similarly, submarine officers are still trained to solve “approach and attack” relative motion problems in their heads while looking through the periscope, just as was done during World War II. The premise is that the machines will fail at the worst possible moment, and therefore you must first use your brain. This fundamental understanding of relative motion is constantly drilled into submariners and produces substantial benefits in matters of navigational safety as well as attacks.

In contrast, on surface ships with systems such as three-dimensional anti-air radars, the mental test of whether what the machine says actually makes sense cannot usually be applied. Sometimes, rather than having an appropriately questioning attitude, there seems to be a willingness to simply believe what the machine tells you, even with simple systems like sonars and surface search radars, where it might otherwise be possible to conduct mental quality checks.

Paradox five is that because surface combatants generally have multiple sensor systems observing the same physical event, they are data-rich. But because they are inundated by data, they are often information-poor and less able to process what all the data means. The great volume of it often gives them more confidence than they should have in their

situational awareness. They therefore often have a confidence-to-reality mismatch that sometimes causes them to act in inappropriate ways.

In contrast, on submarines, it is normal that a given target is only held on a single sensor (sonar when submerged, and a relatively low-tech radar when surfaced). If lucky, a submariner might even hold the target visually on the surface or at periscope depth. That means the mental aspects of situational awareness are far more elemental on submarines, and conservative, almost worst-case assumptions were far more likely to be made.

Paradox six is that even the most advanced fast-attack submarines are ungainly, maneuvering hogs on the surface compared with sleek surface combatants, yet the surface crews often take longer to act. Submarines on the surface have such small radar signatures that merchant ships using radar may presume they are nothing more than very maneuverable small boats. As a result, merchant crews almost always act as if they believe the small-boat-looking-submarine can easily maneuver out of the way of the merchant, which is not normally possible for a 6,000-ton warship with very little freeboard. Because of that, submariners must often presume that the maneuvering burden is on them, regardless of what the rules of the road prescribe. We train to maneuver early to avoid in-extremis situations.

In contrast, surface combatant crews often believe their ships’ exceptional maneuverability will get them out of trouble, and as a result they sometimes wait longer than is prudent to execute avoidance maneuvers.

The seventh and final paradox was revealed to me in 1994, when, as a submarine executive officer, I conducted a study of how to improve mariner skills. I found that the mindset required for being a good mariner is often in conflict with what is needed for being a good warrior, and this holds just as true in submarines as it does in surface ships. Aviators understand this: junior officers are first expected to learn how to fly their planes competently while developing good “air sense,” long before they ever have to worry about fighting the plane. This is why I have recommended since the mid-1990s that mariner training be separated from ship combat training. Tactical qualifications should be delayed until officers prove themselves as competent shiphandlers and developed good “sea sense.”

It is often said that culture will trump strategy any day of the week. The lesson of these paradoxes is that culture also can trump technology.

I don’t know if any of these factors were at play in recent crises. I do know they may be contributing factors that should be examined.

Captain Toti commanded Fleet Antisubmarine Warfare Command Norfolk, Submarine Squadron 3 in Pearl Harbor, and USS Indianapolis (SSN-697). He is a frequent contributor to Proceedings and recently Proceedings Today

From Charles MacVean

Bob,

My comment is that Retired Navy Captains should not make comments until the investigations are complete. Yes, he may have germane thoughts, but they may well be out of context with what actually happened. I could make lots of conjectures and concerns, but I think that Retired Folks should not make comments on the current apparent happenings. Our forces today are working with a lot of parameters that we never dealt with. And more power to them. They don't need the Ancient Mariners drawing from a non applicable past experience to condemn what might have happened. Surface Warfare Officers should adapt to the submariners practice of "Run Deep, Run Silent".

Charlie

The following involves a search for a group photo of Haddo 255 in Tokyo Harbor at the end of the war, it would help if anyone could assist in the search. An example photo from another submarine at end of document

Ed----- Original Message -----

From: [Greg](#)

To: ehergert@cox.net

Sent: Saturday, July 29, 2017 10:24 AM

Subject: Researching Haddo Photo

Greetings Edwin,

I'm writing to see if you might direct me to the best resource for locating a copy of a specific photo of the USS Haddo with a limited portion of the crew standing on top. My cousin's father (deceased) was on the USS Haddo and recollects a long lost photo she describes as a black & white image, with about 40 crew members standing on the USS Haddo, potentially around the Japanese surrender ceremonies (but maybe at another time). Although I don't believe the photo is annotated with service member names, her father was among those in the photo. His name was Alfred Dennis Grice and was in service 1943-1946. My cousin's 60th birthday is coming up in late September and if I could locate in an archive & have a copied produced, it would be a heartfelt gift. Any resource you could direct me to is much appreciated; the online images I've found do not fit the description she has provided.

Thank you

Greg

Example group photo WWII Tokyo bay



Photo # NH 90517 Crew of USS Archerfish, in Tokyo Bay, 1 Sept. 1945